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Obama 2: Future Implications for EU-US Relations 
 
 
Maxime Henri André Larivé
 
 
 
“Common values, overlapping interests, and shared goals are the foundation of what is often described 
as the transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe. Many observers stress that in 
terms of security and prosperity the United States and Europe have grown increasingly interdependent.” 
2012 CRS Report
1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The  week  following  his  reelection,  President  Obama  traveled  to  Asia  –  Thailand,  Myanmar,  and 
Cambodia –, while facing at home a fiscal cliff, the need to select the next Secretaries of State, Defense, 
and Treasury, and the resignation of one of America’s most senior and respected generals and Director of 
the CIA, David Petraeus; all this at the moment wherein the Middle East is burning in flames due to 
another round of violence between Israel and Hamas. On the other side of the pond, the EU is currently 
trying to solve or at least contain several crises: the Eurozone, agreeing on the Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2014-2020, or MFF 2014-2020,
2 and saving France.
3 
  For both giants, the American and European priorities are domestic; they both need to do some 
‘nation-building at home.’
4 The threat of the fiscal cliff in the US and the one of the Eurocrisis in Europe 
are  too  important  to  be  ignored  and  so  visceral  that  they  will  affect  the  way  both  actors  behave 
internationally and interact with one another. 
  The big question since Obama’s reelection has been what will the EU-US relations look like 
under his second mandate? And will there be any differences from the first one?
5 This paper argues that 
the US-EU relations will remain quite similar as it was under the first Obama presidency. Nevertheless, 
with the current shift to Asia, the ‘pivot,’ the EU will be required to increase its contributions to global 
politics and international security. This paper is structured in three parts. First, the economic and political 
climax of the EU and the US will be presented. In a second a part, the EU and US strategies and foreign 
policies will be laid out. Last but not least, several core issues facing the Euro-Atlantic community, such 
as the Asia pivot, Iran, climate change, and the economy will be addressed. Other issues such as Syria, 
Afghanistan, and the Middle East and North Africa will not be addressed in this paper.
6  
 
THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 
 
Power of US Domestic Politics 
The domestic forces in the US are certainly powerful and strongly affect the governing process. The 
current bipartisan politics have had an impact of the way President Obama and the US act internationally.  
                                                           
 This paper is issued from a presentation on the theme of “EU-US Relations after the US presidential election.” 
This was part of a discussion series organized by the EU Center of Excellence at the University of Miami on 
November 20
th, 2012. I want to thank the Consul General of France, Gaël de Maisonneuve, the Jean Monnet Chair 
and  Director  of  the  EU  Center,  Joaquín  Roy,  and  Ambassador  Ambler  Moss  for  their  participations,  raising 
important arguments in their discussions and offering crucial comments contributing to the strengthening of the 
overall argument of this article. I also want to express my gratitude to Beverly Barrett for her assistance throughout 
the reviewing process.  
 Maxime Henri André Larivé received his Ph.D. in International Studies from the University of Miami.  He is a 
Jean Monnet Postdoctoral Fellow at the EU Center of Excellence and a Lecturer at the Department of International 
Studies at the University of Miami. His research focuses on EU foreign and security policy, EU-Russia relations, 
energy  security,  and  transatlantic  relations.  His  work  has  been  published  in  several  peer-reviewed  journals: 
European  Security,  Perceptions:  Journal  of  International  Affairs,  EUMA,  and  soon  Whitehead  Journal  of 
Diplomacy and International Relations. He writes weekly commentaries for Foreign Policy Association’s Blogs. 4 
 
Despite a high degree of comfort and affinities from Europeans towards the person of President 
Obama, Mr. Obama has certainly not been at his ease in interacting with his European counterparts. In 
fact Mr. Obama has been described as the first post-European president.
7 But what does that mean for 
Europe? As demonstrated by President Obama during his first mandate, the US has been shifting his 
attention towards Asia and other emerging powers. The stability of Europe combined with the deep 
degree of economic interaction between the two blocs  counts transatlantic trade valued at $636 billion in 
2011. The European Commission describes the EU -US  relations  as  the  “most  integrated  economic 
relationship in the world.”
8 The degree of stability of the economic relationship alongside a long-standing 
political cooperation between the US and EU allows President Obama to focus on new poles of power. 
Even during the last presidential debate on foreign policy in November 2012, both candidates – Mitt 
Romney and Barack Obama – never mentioned Europe or even the European Union. French Ambassador 
to the US, Mr. François Delattre, argued that Europe is not a security concern anymore for the US and 
does not deserve any critical attention. 
The second major element that could have a negative impact on the next four years is what has 
been called the fiscal cliff. In this case if both sides of the aisle, democrats and republicans, fail to find an 
agreement before the end of the year 2012, the risk of a recession will be looming over the US recovery 
caused by automatic tax rises and spending cuts. “The realization of all of the automatic tax increases and 
spending cuts that make up the fiscal cliff, absent offsetting changes, would pose a substantial threat to 
the recovery,” Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke said.
9  
The last element that needs to be taken into consideration is the change in leadership in key 
positions in Washington. For instance, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Panetta, Secretary of State, Ms. 
Clinton, and the US Ambassador to the UN, Ms. Rice, may either retire or receive a new assignment. In 
the case of the departure of Ms. Clinton, the Under Secretary of State Phil Gordon, who has a very strong 
knowledge of European politics, may very well leave the Department of State. 
All these factors will be crucial in shaping the foundation of the next four years for President 
Obama. Despite a change of leadership at key cabinet secretaries, one needs to understand the degree of 
mutual understanding between the two sides of the pond.
10 Such historical and cultural connections are a 
central variable in maintaining solid and lasting relationships between European capitals and Washington. 
 
The State of the European Union 
Since the fall of the Lehman Brothers, the EU has been facing visceral crises, especially the one affecting 
the common currency, the Euro. Despite the many rounds of meeting the Eurocrisis remains threatening. 
Spain, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus and Italy have already been considerably weakened by the crisis. 
Their respective governments have already implemented heavy austerity measures leading to the rise of 
extremism, nationalism, high unemployment, poverty and domestic instabilities.
11  In some instance, the 
Eurocrisis has led to the demise of basic democratic principles in several EU countries such as Italy and 
Greece.
12 The crisis is so severe, that France has been identified recently as the sick man of Europe. Even 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) raised the alarm over a possible recession in France. 
  The second pressing crisis looming over Europe is the discussion over the EU’s budget for 2014-
2020, or what is called the MFF 2014-2020.
13 The United Kingdom has been active in blocking any 
increase  of  the  EU  budget.  Cameron’s  position  is  caused  by  several  factors:  first,  the  strong 
euroskepticism sentiments within the conservative party have limited Prime Minister Cameron’s ability to 
act in favor of the common project; second, Cameron has implemented since his election severe austerity 
measures in order to deal with Britain’s budget deficit.
14 For these reasons, the UK has been in favor of 
cutting the overall EU budget for the next decade. So far the first victim has been the European Defense 
Agency (EDA), which saw the expansion of its budget vetoed by the UK. The EDA’s budget will remain 
at  30.4  million  euros  –  without taking  in  consideration  the  rate of inflation  –  per  year for the  next 
decade.
15 This will have an undeniable impact on the ability of the EU to push forward its approach of 
‘pooling & sharing.’  
  The  last  piece  of  the  puzzle  is  Germany.  Since  the  election  of  French  President,  François 
Hollande, in May 2012, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has been able to advance its vision of 
Europe. The limited Franco-German relation is creating a distorted European balance. Nevertheless, it 
appears that French President, Mr. Hollande, and his German counterpart, Ms. Merkel, have been able to 5 
 
work  out  their  relationships  and  underline  their  commitments  to  the  Euro  and  the  European  Union. 
Germany will be an important actor to follow considering its coming elections in 2013. 
 
DIVERGENCES OF STRATEGIES 
 
A US Strategy for the 21
st century? 
As opposed to the Bush doctrine – preventive war and unilateralism – the Obama doctrine is much more 
adapted to the current financial and international context facing the US.
16 In this age of austerity and 
economic recovery military invasions and occupations along the lines of Iraq and Afghanistan operations 
are simply not feasible and domestically unpopular. The Obama doctrine is in  fact composed of several 
elements: use of tactical forces  – drones, US Special Forces, cyberweapons –, soft power, diplomatic 
tools – sanctions –, and multilateral military operations – the so-called ‘leading from behind’ –. Such 
strategy is certainly less costly and allows the US to remain active globally and reactive to any types of 
international crisis. 
  Furthermore,  American  theorists  have  increasingly  been  writing  about  the  strategy  of 
retrenchment. In the case of retrenchment, Parent and MacDonald define it as: 
‘retrenchment’ as a policy of retracting grand strategic commitments in response to a 
decline in relative power. Abstractly, this means decreasing the overall costs of foreign 
policy by redistributing resources away from peripheral commitments and toward core 
commitments.
17 
 
This retrenchment implies that the next four years will see a limited degree of transatlantic activism.
18 The 
US retrenchment will be materialized in three steps: first,  reduce its global military footprint; second, 
change the size and composition of the U.S. military; third, use the resulting ‘retrenchment dividend’ to 
foster economic recovery at home.
19 
Ultimately, as argued by Christopher Layne, “this retrenchment will push to the fore a new US 
grand  strategy  –  offshore  balancing.”
20  Offshore  balancing  is  central  as  it  will  avoid  an  ‘imperial 
overstretch’ as it will shift the US strategy confronted the rise of new powers and US economic erosion. 
This offshore balancing strategy incorporates several strategic principles:
21 
-  fiscal and economic constraints requiring the US to set strategic priorities. For instance, the 
US will have to reduce its military presence in Europe 
-  maintaining America’s comparative strategic advantages being naval and air power 
-  emphasis on burden-shifting rather than burden-sharing. For instance, Europeans will have to 
do for their security and increase their contribution to international security 
-  lowering US military footprint in Middle East 
-  avoiding long-scale military interventions, such as nation-building à la Irak.  
 
This  retrenchment  is  more  complex  than  simple  defense  cuts,  as  it  also  implies  a  reassessment  of 
America’s interests and goals for the 21
st century. In the case of Europe, it will mean to increase EU’s 
contribution to international security. However, the neorealist literature tends to avoid the question of 
cooperation.  The  degree  of  interdependence  between  the  US  and  the  EU  is  unique  and  should  be 
addressed as such. NATO will be an important actor in the 21
st century as it allows Europeans to increase 
their defense contributions, while maintaining strong security ties with Washington. The UN, even though 
it has been inefficient in Syria, will as well be a crucial platform of interactions and norm-diffusion to 
emerging countries. The power of international institutions – United Nations, World Trade Organization, 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, G-20, etc. – is central in order to maintain the diffusion of 
Euro-Atlantic values, norms, principles such as human rights, democracy and human security. 
As underlined by Missiroli and Pawlak, the US faces several strategic priorities: 
-  usual suspects: the Middle East, Iran, Global terrorism 
-  First-term leftovers: Afghanistan, the strategic ‘pivot’ to Asia, the ‘rest’ relations 
with Moscow, democratic transitions in the Arab world, Syria, and Guantanamo.
22 
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These  issues  do  fit  within  the  new  strategic  vision  of  the  US,  but  will  necessitate  international 
cooperation, fostered by the Euro-Atlantic community, in order to find common lasting positions and 
solutions. 
 
Multilateralism ‘à la Européenne’ 
The  European  strategy  and  foreign  policy  has  not  much  evolved  since  the  2003  European  Security 
Strategy and the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy.
23 Both strategic 
documents underline the European strategy based on three aspects: first, effective multilateralism; second, 
strategic partnership; third, nexus between security and development. 
An important actor was supposed to increase the global strategic visibility of the EU, through the 
European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS created by the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon was 
implemented in order to lead and shape the foreign policy of the Union. Unfortunately three factors can 
be identified as negatively impacting the achievements of the EEAS: first, a weak leadership by the High 
Representative Catherine Ashton. She has been called the accidental   diplomat  due  to  her  lack  of 
knowledge  of  foreign  policy  and  her  surprising  appointment  back  in  2009.
24  She has been heavily 
criticized for her limited strategic vision and actions, which has been the case at many occasions such as 
during the Arab Spring,
25 Libya, Haiti,
26 and so on. Second, the Member States, especially the Big Three 
– Berlin, London, and Paris – have played a crucial role in sidelining the EEAS and HR Ashton. London 
and Paris bypassed Brussels at many occasions, as it was the case during the Libyan military intervention 
launched under the auspice of the UN and with the firepower of NATO. Last but not least, the European 
and international climax have not been auspicious to the development, effort, and willingness of the EU 
Member States to contribute to the construction of the EEAS.  
Historically, the US has provided the overall security of the European continent and ultimately 
protecting the development of the European project through NATO. But why has the US been willing to 
carry out a disproportionate share of NATO’s burden?
27 This strategy has allowed a certain degree of 
free-riding within the community since the beginning of the Cold War until today. On the other side, 
Europeans have over time passed the buck, asking the US to carry a greater share of the costs and risks. 
Theorists like Layne have argued recently that the new US internationalist strategy should be to leave 
Europe and strengthen the military autonomy of Europe. By doing so, ties between the US and the EU 
will be stronger than the ones maintained by NATO, and would limit the process of overstretching of US 
power. Some have argued that balancing the US is too difficult and costly, which explains the behavior of 
EU Member States to instead either bandwagon through NATO, or balance through the EU.
28 
Considering the current regional and global climax, it is fair to assume that the EU and especially 
its major Member States – Paris and London – are using NATO in order to maintain their influence on the 
global stage. The  Common  Security  and  Defense  Policy  (CSDP)  may  have  been  one  of the  biggest 
victims of the financial crisis. Howorth argued that a recalibration of the CSDP-NATO relationship is 
necessary and should be “integrated through the EU and empowered through NATO.”
29 The Libyan 
mission has certainly underlined the need for rethinking the role and use of the CSDP in the post-financial 
crisis world. 
 
FOUR STRATEGIC REALITIES FOR THE NEXT FOUR YEARS 
 
The ‘pivot’ to Asia 
The ‘pivot,’ symbolizing the strategic shift to Asia, is real. It has been the cornerstone of the first mandate 
of the Obama’s foreign policy. His first trip in November 2012 as newly reelected president took place in 
Asia. The  three  countries visited,  Myanmar, Thailand  and  Cambodia,  were  a direct  message  sent  to 
Europe and China. First to Europe, the growing interest and shift to Asia implies that Europeans will have 
to increase their contributions to regional and international security. Second to China, because of the three 
countries visited, they all encircle China Southern part. Building alliances with China’s neighbors may 
certainly be a cornerstone of the US containment policy of China. 
However, as underlined by Christopher Hill, “another aspect of the pivot involves moving away 
from the Middle East.”
30 This means that a stable Middle East and North Africa is a core component for a 
successful US shift to Asia. Considering the current financial climax, the US would certainly be unable to 
play a leading role onto two theaters simultaneously. This also means that the Europeans will have to 7 
 
increase their contributions in stabilizing the Middle East. Justin Vaïsse of the Brookings argued that the 
US pivot to Asia goes through a step up of Europeans in the Middle East.
31 
Furthermore, in Dyer’s article published in the Financial Times, Tom Donilon, the White House 
national security adviser, said: “The US is a Pacific power whose interests are inextricably linked with 
Asia’s economic security and political order. America’s success in the 21
st century is tied to the success of 
Asia.”
32 In the case of the EU, Asia is seen as a strong economic and political partner. For instance, 
Chinese direct investments have increased these last decades in Europe and even triple in 2011.
33 The 
degree of trade and investment between China and the EU will certainly continue to increase in the 
coming decades. But the EU will have to adjust its perceptions towards Asia as well.  Herman van 
Rompuy recently declared that “Europe is clearly not a Pacific power and will not become one.”
34 Despite 
some geographical truth, the EU will need to change its position and its strategic understanding of the 
region. 
  Ultimately, the Asian ‘pivot’ of Washington can only succeed with the contribution of Europe. 
For the US to shift its grand strategy to Asia, the EU will have to step up its contributions to international 
security in the Middle East and Wider Europe. The Obama doctrine does fit with the ‘pivot’ as it allows 
the US to intervene on the cheap thanks to the contribution of the Europeans where it matters as proven in 
Libya in 2011. At the difference with Afghanistan costing $300 million a day, the cost for the intervention 
in Libya was only $3million a day.
35 
 
Dealing with a Nuclear Iran 
Iran may be one of the few issues where the EU can take the lead and play an active role along the sides 
of the US. The EU could play a central role in the coming year of 2013. 2013 has been identified as the 
year of diplomacy in order to find a solution with Iran. The threat of war has been looming between the 
US and Iran since the first decade of the 21
st century. The Iraq invasion of 2003 was certainly a strategic 
mistake by the Bush administration as Iraq, the only balancer of Iran in the region, has been removed and 
wiped out. However, a part of the solution consists in identifying what kind of nuclear power can Iran 
become. There is little doubt – unless a war is launched against Tehran in 2013 – that Iran will become a 
nuclear power. The question for the members of the Euro-Atlantic community is what kind of nuclear 
Iran can they live with? Changing the perceptions and visions will be an important starting point in 
establishing the bases for the new rounds of negotiation with Tehran. 
The EU had been involved under the High Representative (HR) Javier Solana in the negotiation 
with Iran in 2003, under what was known the EU3+1 – France, Germany, United Kingdom + HR –. 
Despite months of negotiations, diplomacy failed and led to a rising degree of frustration in the US.
36 For 
instance, Mr. Obama, at the time candidate for the Presidency, voiced some frustrations when declaring 
“We  cannot  unconditionally  rule  out  an  approach  that  could  prevent  Iran  from  obtaining  a  nuclear 
weapon. We have tried limited, piecemeal talks while we outsource the sustained work to our European 
allies. It is time for the United States to lead.”
37 
Since the failure of the diplomatic attempt of EU3+1, the EU and the US have implemented some 
of the hardest sanctions on Iran.
38 It appears with little doubt that Iran will become a nuclear state in the 
next years. This will neither be a failure of the Obama administration nor of the EU. As per the father of 
the theory of balance of power, Kenneth Waltz a rgued in  Foreign Affairs that a nuclear Iran “would 
probably be the best possible result: the one most likely to restore stability to the Middle East.”
39 Such 
statement is in fact embedded in the assumption that a nuclear Iran would deter Israel. It is a typical case 
of deterrence based on the examples of the US-Soviet Union and India-Pakistan.  
President Obama could certainly launched a new round of diplomatic negotiations between the 
EU, US and Iran. Reaching out to Russia and China would certainly be an important stepping-stone for 
the credibility of the 2013 diplomatic negotiations. 
 
Addressing Climate Change: A tax or more trade? 
Hurricane Sandy crashing onto the US Eastern coast in early November 2012 has, apparently, been the 
awaking moment for the US. Even the members of the Republican Party, usually dismissing the link 
between climate change and human impact, have called for new policies in order to address the risks 
associated with global warming. 8 
 
As demonstrated during the 15
th session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2009, or COP15, followed by the COP16 in 2010, and 
COP17 in 2011, the EU and US were not in sync. The lack of unity has had a considerable role on the 
failure of all three UN meetings on Climate Change. The most obvious was the COP15 taking place in 
Copenhagen, where for the first time the ‘Rest’  – BRICS countries led by  China  – did balance the 
influence and power of a divided West, which affected the outcomes of the convention. Since then, the 
Europeans have been increasing their diplomatic reach in order to develop strategic partnerships and push 
for a global set of rules on carbon emissions.
40 
Quite interestingly, in the mind of Americans, climate change is still closely li nked to energy 
independence. The latest energy revolution taking place in the US, shale gas, has completely changed the 
dynamics. The US is on its way to become the largest producer of gas by 2020 well beyond Russia.
41 The 
narrative in the US has been that  shale gas not only will permit to lower carbon emissions, but is also 
environmental friendly. Such assumption has been a strong point of debate within the specialized 
literature.
42 For instance, Europeans, at the exception of Poland, have stopped the production of shale gas 
due to the environmental risks associated with the extraction process, so -called fracking, which is a mix 
of sand, water and undisclosed chemicals underground in order to release the unconventional gas stacked 
in the rocks. 
In order to address the problem of gas emissions, which have been identified as the major cause 
of global warming, two solutions are currently on the table: carbon tax or Emission Trading Scheme 
(ETS).
43 The carbon tax has been advanced as the best option to regulate gas  emissions. Even Shell’s 
chief executive, Peter Voser, was calling governments to introduce a carbon tax, or a minimum price for 
CO2, because “the ETS was failing to deliver sufficient incentives to kickstart expensive technologies 
such as carbon capture and storage.”
44 Furthermore, the current financial crisis has hurt the credibility of a 
solid and reliable trading system considering the flaws of market-based mechanisms. Thus, a tax on 
carbon would be a more accurate way to calculate the actual emissions. In the case of the EU, it has been 
argued that a carbon tax would have the greatest impact on the “green growth” of the EU, rather than the 
ETS, which has been the flagship of the EU climate policy instrument.
45 Despite a lack of unity in the US, 
the politics tend to favor a trading scheme rather than a tax. 
Even though both actors may disagree on the future of shale gas and on the creation of carbon 
tax, it is undeniable that under the second mandate of President Obama, the EU and the US must work 
closely together in order to push for new sets of global regulations in order to address climate change. The 
discussion over carbon tax or ETS will be crucial in the coming four years. Europeans are keen on 
pushing new norms, but only with the support of the US can  they be transferred and adopted by other 
countries and global institutions. 
 
Saving the Eurozone 
Throughout the American presidential race, Republican candidate, Mitt Romney, was often caught euro-
bashing. He underlined that if the US remains under the path implemented by President Obama the US 
would  become  Spain.  Even  though  many  experts  would  strongly  reject  this  statement,  one  needs  to 
recognize that an eventual collapse of the Eurozone
46 would most likely take with it the US recovery, and 
have serious impacts on global markets and even causing a global recession. In any case, the economy 
will be at the heart of the next four years for Obama and next decade for the Europeans. 
The night following the reelection of President Obama, the President of the Euro pean Council, 
Mr. Van Rompuy, and the President of the Commission, Mr. Barroso, congratulated Mr. Obama. Their 
shared congratulation statement read: 
We have the pleasure of extending our warm congratulations to President Obama on his 
re-election as President of the United States of America. The United States is a key 
strategic partner of the European Union and we look forward to continuing the close 
cooperation  established  with  President  Obama  over  these  last  four  years,  to  further 
strengthening our bilateral ties and to jointly addressing global challenges, including in 
the fields of security and economy. 9 
 
Creation of growth and jobs remains a priority for both the US and the EU and we will 
continue  to  work  with  President  Obama  to  unlock  the  unparalleled  potential  of  the 
transatlantic market. We are also ready to continue our intense cooperation in foreign 
policy issues and in the promotion of our common values. We look forward to meeting 
President  Obama  at  an  early  date  in  order  to  reconfirm  our  priorities  and  provide 
renewed impetus to our joint action.
47 
One  of  the  core  components  of  this  statement  is  the  fact  that  both  European  leaders  called  for 
“unlock[ing] the unparalleled potential of the transatlantic market.” The US and EU have the largest trade 
and investment relationship in the world combining almost 40% of global gross domestic product.
48 Even 
though President Obama made a strategic mistake when sending Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy 
Geithner, to a European meeting of finance ministers in September 2011,
49 the Europeans and Americans 
need to increase their degree of cohesion and cooperation on economic issues. Nevertheless, the first 
Obama administration has been in regular contact with German Chancellor Merkel and other EU officials 
and leaders. The transatlantic trade and financial relations remain stronger than ever and have increased 
despite the financial crisis; but the political agreement on reforming the international financial system has 
been lacking as proven by the G-20 meetings of Pittsburg.  
  The EU and US needs to push for a common vision on reforming the global banking system  – 
through taxation or regulation – as well as strengthening cohesion on economic and financial reforms. 
Solidifying the transatlantic market will certainly be a core aspect in the recovery of the two sides of the 
pond. The US and Britain have been pushing for reducing tariffs and regulatory barriers to trade and 
investment.
50  Others, such as continental Europe, France under President Hollande, Germany, and 
Scandinavian countries tend to disagree with such neoliberal approach and would rather see stronger 
regulations and taxations especially on the banking sector. A good platform in order to strengthen a 
transatlantic market and a common position on the future of curre nt neoliberal order will have to take 
place through the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC), which was created in 2007. The TEC will be a 
good platform for fostering transatlantic economic and financial cohesion. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
No, Obama won’t, most likely, increase the degree of cooperation and interaction with Europe from the 
2008-2012  standards.  Despite  a  high  degree  of  attraction  for  Obama  in  Europe,  Europe  needs  to 
understand that Obama embodies a new class of American leaders raised in the post-European world.
51 
Yes,  Obama  needs the  EU  in order to  implement the ‘pivot’ to  Asia  and  address  vital  international 
security issues. The EU ought to find a solution to the Eurocrisis, and step up its foreign policy and 
contribution to global peace. NATO may very well be a vehicle for such platform. 
In any case, “Europeans have to wake up to a new world” argued Jonas Parello-Plesner, a senior 
fellow at the ECFR, “where the nature American focus on its European allies remains reduced.”
52  
Several issues are clearly threatening the two sides of the Atlantic: climate change; the future of 
the Arab world; international terrorism; and Asia.
53 If there is one major threat to the influence and power 
of the West – US and EU – it ought to be the economy. As underlined in his influential book in 1987, 
Paul Kennedy
54 demonstrated that weak economic foundation is one of the main variables leading to the 
decline of a great power.
55 The foreign policies of the US and EU will have to take into considerations 
domestic politics. 
The excellent  ECFR  report  asked  the  following  question:  “How  should  Europe  respond  to 
Obama’s reelection?”
56 The answer is that Obama’s pragmatic and universalistic approach to foreign 
policy is unlikely to change. The ‘pivot’ to Asia is real, and the Obama doctrine is at the heart of the US 
strategy  in  Middle  East  and  North  Africa  (MENA),
57  Central Asia, and Africa. The retrenchment 
implemented by the US combined with the unstable and uncertain transitions of Europe’s neighbors – 
Russia, Middle East and Africa – call for a higher degree of integration of the CSDP.
58 European leaders 
need to understand that saving the EU from its visceral crises  – Eurocrisis and nationalism – is only a 
starting point, and that the EU ought to play an increasing role in stabilizing its wider neighborhood. The 10 
 
transatlantic community is more important than ever in order to maintain the status of both the US and the 
EU in this shifting world order. 
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